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Why There Can't be a Logic of Induction1 
Stuart S. Glennan 
Butler University 
Carap's attempt to develop an inductive logic has been criticized on a variety of 
grounds, and while there may be some philosophers who believe that difficulties with 
Carnap's approach can be overcome by further elaborations and modifications of his 
system, I think it is fair to say that the consensus is that the approach as a whole can- 
not succeed. In writing a paper on problems with inductive logic (and with Carnap's 
approach in particular), I might therefore be accused of beating a dead horse. 
However, there are still some (e.g., Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993) who seem to 
believe that purely formal methods for scientific inference can be developed. It may 
still then be useful to perform an autopsy on a dead horse when establishing the cause 
of death can shed light on issues of current concern. 
My intention in this paper is to point out a problem in Carnap's inductive logic 
which has not been clearly articulated, and which applies generally to any inductive 
logic. My conclusion will be that scientific inference is inevitably and ineliminably 
guided by background beliefs and that different background beliefs lead to the appli- 
cation of different inductive rules and different standards of evidentiary relevance. At 
the end of this paper I will discuss the relationship between this conclusion and the 
problem of justifying induction. 
1. The Task of an Inductive Logic 
An inductive logic is a calculus which allows one to determine the relevance of some 
set of evidence to establishing the truth of an empirical hypothesis. Camap conceives the 
problem of defining such a calculus to be one of defining a conditional probability mea- 
sure, c(h,e). The parameters h and e are sentences in a scientific language representing 
the hypothesis and the evidence respectively; c(h,e), is meant to measure the probability 
of the hypothesis given the evidence. Once one has chosen a particular c, the evidentiary 
relationship becomes completely formal. Since there are infinitely many possible c' s, the 
problem is to choose one which captures our intuitions about evidentiary relations. 
Carnap's strategy for choosing a c function has two steps. First Carnap proposed a 
set of adequacy conditions that any c function must satisfy. These adequacy condi- 
tions are meant to explicate our intuitions about inductive inference. They include the 
requirement that a c function define a fair betting system, and the requirement that the 
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function should allow one to "learn from experience." The adequacy conditions, 
while greatly narrowing one's choice of c function, can be satisfied by infinitely many 
different functions. Carnap's second step therefore was to propose a particular proba- 
bility measure, c*, that satisfied the adequacy conditions.2 
Carnap's analysis of inductive inference has been criticized on a variety of 
grounds. Perhaps the most important involve the justification of Carap's choice of a 
particular c function. First, given that the adequacy conditions can be satisfied by a 
wide range of functions, there seems to be no reason to prefer c* to other functions 
satisfying those conditions. Second, Carnap can offer no justification of his adequacy 
conditions other than that they capture our intuitions about inductive inference. Like 
Hume's principle of the uniformity of nature, Carnap's adequacy conditions seem to 
be principles which can be established neither by logic nor experience. 
The presumption behind these objections is that Carnap's c* has succeeded in captur- 
ing our intuitions about inductive inference, and that the philosophical problem is that 
these intuitions cannot be justified. Even those who argue that c* is an incorrect recon- 
struction of our intuitions about induction leave open the possibility that an alternative to 
c* could be offered, and that then only the problem of justification would remain. If 
these were the only sorts of objections that could be posed, then further work on induc- 
tive logic would be warranted. The problem of the justification of induction could be 
dismissed as a pseudo-problem, and problems with the particular choice of c function 
could be met by introducing c functions which meet more refined adequacy conditions. 
My objection is more fundamental, for it suggests not merely that a particular c func- 
tion is inadequate, or that our choice of c functions cannot be justified on empirical or 
logical grounds, but rather that the very same evidence can lead us to make different in- 
ductive inferences, depending upon the context in which we make the inference. If I am 
right, then there can be no logic of induction, because our inductive inferences inevitably 
depend upon background beliefs which we have concerning the causes of the observa- 
tions we use as evidence, and which cannot be completely captured in the calculus. 
I will argue for my conclusion by analyzing a particular thought experiment which 
Carap himself discussed. Carnap used this thought experiment to argue for the supe- 
riority of his c* over another possible c function, ct.3 The crucial difference between 
these two functions is that c* allows one to "learn from experience," while ct does 
not. I will argue, contrary to Carnap, that the reason why c* seems more plausible 
than ct as a way to make predictions about the outcome of his thought experiment is 
not that c* is universally rationally preferable to ct, but rather that Carnap (and the 
reader) has made certain implicit assumptions about the nature of the mechanism pro- 
ducing the experimental results. Different assumptions about the experimental mech- 
anism make ct more plausible than c*. 
2. Two Thought Experiments 
In a non-technical article on inductive logic (Carnap 1955), Carnap attempted to 
make c* plausible by illustrating its application to a simple experiment involving 
drawing balls from an urn. We are to imagine an experimental setup in which there 
are four balls in an urn, each of which has one of two mutually exclusive properties, 
say being white or black. Suppose that we draw balls one by one from the urn. For 
each draw from the urn, our inductive method will assign a probability to the hypoth- 
esis that the ball will be a certain color. For instance, our inductive method will give 
the probability that the first ball will be white, or the probability that the third ball will 
be white, given that the first two were black. 
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Suppose we make four draws from the urn. There are sixteen possible outcomes, 
which we can denote by a sequence of Bs and Ws. For example, BWWW represents 
the outcome of drawing a white ball followed by three black balls. We can complete- 
ly specify a c function for this experiment by assigning a prior probability to each of 
these possible outcomes. Carnap calls these possible outcomes individual distribu- 
tions. So long as the sixteen values sum to one, the c function will satisfy the mini- 
mum condition of being a probability measure. If there really is a logic of induction, 
then there should be some assignments that are better than others, and ideally one as- 
signment which we can offer reasons to prefer. 
Carnap of course thinks that some assignments are better than others. To make his 
point he considers two possible assignments which I shall call method t and method *.4 
Both of them apply the classical principle of indifference to the set of possible out- 
comes, but they do so in different ways. In the first case, Carnap assumes that, in the 
absence of further evidence, each of the sixteen individual distributions are equiproba- 
ble, assigning them probability 1/16. This is the probability assignment that would be 
made by the measure ct. In the second case, we apply the principle of indifference 
twice. First we aggregate the individual distributions according to the number of black 
balls they contain. Carnap calls these aggregates statistical distributions. There are 
five such distributions, each of which we assign the probability 1/5. Next, we apply the 
principle of indifference to the individual distributions comprising each statistical distri- 
bution, assuming that the probability of 1/5 is divided evenly among each of the con- 
stituent individual distributions. This method yields probability assignments identical 
to those that would be made by c*. The assignments of prior probabilities to individual 
distributions are summarized in the table below:5 
Once we have specified the prior probabilities, it is possible to measure the proba- 
bility of any hypothesis given any evidence. To calculate the prior probability of a 
hypothesis, one merely sums the probabilities for all of the individual distributions in 
Statistical Individual Method t Method * 
Distributions Distributions 
Black White Probability Probability Probability 
of Individual of Statistical of Individual 
Distributions Distributions Distributions 
4 0 BBBB 1/16 1/5 1/5 
3 1 BBBW 1/16 1/5 1/20 
BBWB 1/16 1/20 
BWBB 1/16 1/20 
WBBB 1/16 1/20 
2 2 BBWW 1/16 1/5 1/30 
2 2 BWBW 1/16 1/30 
BWWB 1/16 1/30 
WBBW 1/16 1/30 
WBWB 1/16 1/30 
WWBB 1/16 1/30 
1 3 BWWW 1/16 1/5 1/20 
WBWW 1/16 1/20 
WWBW 1/16 1/20 
WWWB 1/16 1/20 
4 4 WWWW 1/16 1/5 1/5 
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which the hypothesis holds. To calculate the probability of a hypothesis given some 
evidence, one finds the sum of probabilities for individual distributions in which both 
the evidence and hypothesis hold, and divides it by the sum of probabilities for indi- 
vidual distributions in which the evidence holds. 
Let H1 be the hypothesis that the first ball picked is white and H2 the hypothesis 
that the first two balls picked are white. Using the above table we can calculate for 
each method the probability of H1, H2 and H2 given H1: 
Hypothesis Method t Method * 
H1 1/2 1/2 
H2 1/4 1/3 
H2 given H1 1/2 2/3 
Both of these methods yield coherent sets of expectations. The problem is to de- 
cide which to apply. Carnap argued for method * over method t because method * al- 
lows one to learn from experience. We can illustrate this point by reference to the 
table above. Method t says that the probability that the next ball picked will be white 
is 1/2, regardless of what picks have gone before. On the other hand, according to 
method *, the probability of a second white ball given a first white ball is higher (2/3) 
than the probability of the first ball being white (1/2). It is important for the subse- 
quent argument to notice that these methods are formal in the sense that the values 
calculated do not depend upon of our interpretation of the B's and W's. 
The requirement that an inductive method allow us to learn from experience is one 
of Carnap's adequacy conditions. Carnap states the principle as follows: 
Inductive thinking is a way of judging hypotheses concerning unknown events. 
In order to be reasonable, this judging must be guided by our knowledge of ob- 
served events. More specifically, other things being equal, a future event is to 
be regarded as the more probable, the greater the relative frequency of similar 
events observed so far under similar circumstances. This principle of learning 
from experience guides, or rather ought to guide, all inductive thinking in ev- 
eryday affairs and in science (Carap 1955, 286).6 
Elsewhere (Carap 1945, ?16) Carnap argues for this claim using Reichenbach's ar- 
gument that a method which allows one to learn from experience is rational, because 
only such a method will in the long run allow one to improve one's ability to predict 
things in the world, supposing that the world is predictable at all. Much of the appeal 
of Carnap's c* however derives from its intuitive plausibility as applied to concrete 
cases like the urn experiment. If the first three balls that we draw out of the urn are 
white, it would seem foolish (at least according to Carap's intuitions) to insist that 
the probability of the next one being white was only 1/2. 
I believe we have been cheated here. We have been asked to endorse the principle 
of learning from experience largely on the basis of its plausibility as applied to partic- 
ular thought experiments like this one. It is possible however to construct a formally 
identical thought experiment which yields quite different intuitions. Suppose that 
rather than drawing four balls from an urn, our experiment consists of flipping a coin 
four times. Let "W" stand for our getting a heads on a particular toss, and "B" stand 
for our getting tails. Then, using the same nomenclature as in the first experiment, we 
can describe a particular sequence of coin tosses by a sequence of letters such as 
"WWWB". Using table one, we can apply the method discussed above to calculate 
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inductive probabilities. Let HI' be the hypothesis that the first coin toss turns up 
heads, and H2' be the hypothesis that the first two coin tosses turn up heads. Then we 
get the same probabilities as we calculated for H1 and H2. I think that our intuitions 
strongly suggest that we should ignore evidence from the first coin toss in predicting 
the outcome of the second coin toss; that is, we should choose method t over method 
* as a method for predicting the outcome of this experiment. 
We are left in the following intolerable situation: We have two experiments which are 
described by structurally identical languages, and whose spaces of possible outcomes are 
isomorphic. We nevertheless have strong intuitions on the basis of information not for- 
mally described in our language that make us choose method * for the first thought exper- 
iment, and method t for the second. These experiments show that there is no inductive 
method that applies to all situations. We choose an inductive method appropriate to a par- 
ticular situation on the basis of background knowledge or beliefs about that situation. 
I will discuss several responses to these objections in the next section. For the mo- 
ment though, I would like to consider the character of the background beliefs which 
make method * intuitively plausible in one case, but not in the other. In the first case, 
the experiment involves drawing balls from an urn. What we do in the experiment is to 
sample from an underlying distribution. We do not know what this distribution is, but 
we assume that it is fixed. If we believe that our sampling method is unbiased, we ex- 
pect our sample to approximate (within some margin of error) the underlying distribu- 
tion. Because of our understanding of the causal mechanism producing the evidence, 
we believe that past experience (our sample) should be a guide to future expectations.7 
In the second case, the situation is quite different. Rather than thinking that there 
is an underlying distribution from which we sample, we think of the evidence as 
being generated by a sequence of independent coin tosses. What happens on the sec- 
ond trial has nothing to do with what happens on the first, beyond the mere fact that 
we used the same coin. What matters is only our judgment that we are dealing with a 
fair coin; and even if we believe that our coin is not fair, we should, in virtue of the 
independence of the trials, assign the same probability of heads to each trial. 
3. Carapian Rejoinders 
I would like to consider two rejoinders which Carap might offer to the claim that 
these thought experiments show that there is no logic of induction, in the sense of no 
uniquely determined c function. The first is to maintain heroically that method * is the 
correct method even for the second experiment. The second is to argue that the apparent 
inadequacy of method * results from our failure to take into account all relevant evidence. 
Before turning to these rejoinders, I would like to indicate more precisely what 
challenge has been posed by my argument that there are situations in which method t 
is the right method. Carnap admits that there is a continuum of inductive methods 
from which we can not single out one a priori. One might think that in indicating that 
we cannot prefer method * for the coin tossing experiment, I am holding Carnap to a 
standard which he himself did not hold. This is not, however, the case. First, I am 
not arguing that we cannot justify the choice of method * over method t on a priori 
grounds; rather, I am suggesting that there are sound reasons related to our back- 
ground knowledge about experimental setups which dictate the choice of method t 
over method *. Furthermore, according to Carap my preference for method t over 
method * cannot be licensed either by experience or subjective whim because it vio- 
lates a priori axioms for all acceptable c functions.8 
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The heroic defense of method * - Camap's first line of defense is to argue that, con- 
trary to appearances, method * is the correct method to apply to the coin toss case. One 
could construe the coin toss experiment as an experiment to determine whether the coin is 
fair. After all, how can we know that a coin is fair except by experience? The problem 
with this rejoinder is that it should take many more than four trials to shake our confidence 
in the fairness of the coin. In the first experiment, we identify the probability of a black 
ball with the underlying distribution of black balls, but in the second, we do not identify 
the probability of a heads with the distribution of heads in a sequence of experiments. 
I am not denying that in the long run experience might lead us to doubt the fair- 
ness of the coin. If one gets 100 heads in a row, then it would be plausible to doubt 
the fairness of the coin. The difficulty with Carnap's reconstruction of the situation is 
that it does not show the way in which such evidence is brought to bear. There is no 
single method of induction which we apply uniformly to our experience. Rather, 
given antecedent beliefs about the nature of the mechanisms producing the states of 
affairs we take as evidence, we choose a particular inductive method. If our expecta- 
tions are repeatedly not borne out by experience, then at some ill-defined point, we 
begin to doubt our beliefs about the mechanisms which bring about those states of af- 
fairs. We eventually consider using different inductive methods. 
The requirement of total evidence - A second and related way in which Carnap 
could seek to undermine my counterexample would be to invoke what he calls the 
principle of total evidence: 
For an application of inductive logic by an observer X at a certain time t the fol- 
lowing holds: ... If X wishes to apply a principle or theorem of inductive logic to 
his knowledge situation then he must use as evidence his total observational 
knowledge K(t) (Carnap 1963, 972). 
Presumably there must be some observational evidence for our belief that the mecha- 
nism producing the sequence of experimental outcomes is of a certain kind. It may 
well be that the probability of H2' given HI' alone is 2/3, but when we consider as 
evidence both HI' and our evidence for the fairness of the coin, we could very well 
get a probability of H2' around 1/2. The failure of method * to give a plausible value 
comes not from a defect in or limit in the applicability of that method, but rather from 
a failure to consider all relevant observational evidence. 
There is something correct in this rejoinder. If we have any reason to believe that 
the experimental outcomes are being produced by a fair coin, it is because we have at 
some time had evidence to that effect. It would not be fair dealing to expect an induc- 
tive method to give us the intuitively "right" answer without taking this evidence into 
account. The requirement of total evidence is, however, implausibly strict, and is not 
acceptable even as a rational reconstruction of good science. Leaving aside the objec- 
tion that it is unclear what would count as total evidence, it is simply not the case that 
we ever could (or should want to) take into account all observational evidence in eval- 
uating each hypothesis. Furthermore, when we take all evidence into account, we will 
in general invoke more than observations. We will also invoke background theories 
which refer to unobserved (and unobservable) entities. 
The fundamental mistake in Carnap's view is that Carap conceives of inductive infer- 
ence as a process of formal calculation. He believes that at least ideally we should assess 
the probability of a hypothesis h by calculating the value of our preferred c function with 
h and our total observational evidence K(t) as arguments. My claim is that the connec- 
tion between h and K(t) must be mediated by background theory. In order to bridge the 
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logical gap between h and K(t) we must invoke some set of background hypotheses T. 
We believe T in light of K(t) and further background hypotheses T ', and so on. We see 
why we must invoke background theory by considering cases like the experiments de- 
scribed above where implicit assumptions about the mechanisms producing the evidence 
determine what method for calculating the probability of a hypothesis we should use.9 
The view I am suggesting is reminiscent of Glymour's (1980) account of bootstrap- 
ping. Glymour argues that we must use auxiliary hypotheses to make the logical con- 
nection between evidence and hypothesis. The difference between his view and mine is 
that Glymour thinks that all auxiliary hypotheses can be made to explicitly enter into 
one's calculations of evidentiary relevance, while I am arguing that they may implicitly 
guide one's choice of an inductive method as well. This difference is significant, be- 
cause if Glymour is right, it should be possible to define a three-place relation c(h, e, T) 
between hypothesis and evidence with respect to some body of background theory. This 
would still be a logic of induction, albeit a more complex one than Carnap envisioned. 
There are reasons why this proposal cannot succeed. First, it would be impossible 
to actually write down the rules for a plausible three place c function. Given that differ- 
ent background theories determine different relations between hypothesis and evidence, 
writing down the three place function would in essence require one to list the two place 
c functions determined by each possible background theory. However, there are in- 
finitely many such theories, so we could never write them all down. Such a function, if 
it exists, would not be computable (at least in any practical sense). Furthermore, we 
will run into the same problem as we did for two place c functions of determining the 
relation between evidence and hypothesis in the absence of background theory (i.e., for 
null T). If all our theoretical claims are ultimately based only upon our inductive 
method and our total observational knowledge, then there must be some theories which 
do not require background theory for confirmation. A three place c function must con- 
sequently determine probabilities of h given e and null T. But what values should it 
choose - those given by c * or ct, or some other set of values? My analysis suggests 
that in the absence of any background theory there is no answer to this question. Prior 
probabilities cannot be assigned on a priori grounds, but only on the basis of 
hypotheses concerning the mechanisms producing the evidence in question. 
4. The Justification of Induction 
Carnap belongs to a tradition beginning with Hume that regards the justification of 
induction with considerable indifference. While members of this tradition admit that 
principles of inductive reasoning do not admit of either empirical or deductive justifi- 
cation, they point out that we use such principles with confidence and practical suc- 
cess. The point of skepticism about induction is merely to exorcise our rationalistic 
pretensions. Beyond that point, they believe we can and must ignore it. 
Carnap says surprisingly little about the justification of induction, but what he 
does say supports the theory that he took it to be a pseudo-problem. In Carnap 1945 
he remarks that "the situation [regarding induction] has sometimes been characterized 
by saying that a theoretical justification of induction is not possible, and hence that 
there is no problem of induction. However, it would be better to say merely that a 
justification in the old sense is not possible" (Carnap 1945, ? 16). The new kind of 
justification involves showing (1) that the logic we have given accords with our in- 
ductive practices; and (2) that these practices are guaranteed a certain measure of suc- 
cess (provided that the universe is at all predictable). We might rest comfortably at 
this point so long as we believe that there is more or less a single set of intuitive judg- 
ments about inductive inference upon which we can and do successfully rely. 
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The point of my thought experiments is to challenge this assumption. They pro- 
vide an example of structurally identical experiments which produce conflicting intu- 
itions concerning what can be inferred from their outcomes. My challenge is analo- 
gous to the challenge that Goodman posed with his new riddle of induction. The new 
riddle of induction replaced the question "What justifies our principle of induction?" 
with "Why is it that we choose some inductive principles instead of others?" Like 
Goodman's new riddle, my argument shows how formal properties of the language 
describing hypothesis and evidence are insufficient to answer this question. 
A true logic of induction would be a calculus which we ascertain a priori and 
which we can use to calculate the weight which our experience lends to any hypothe- 
sis. There is no such a priori method. Our empiricism must be more thoroughgoing, 
allowing that even our methods of inference are determined by empirical considera- 
tions. Up to a certain point Carnap is sympathetic to this idea. In discussing the rea- 
sons for choosing one among the continuum of inductive methods (by choosing a par- 
ticular value for a parameter k), Carnap remarks: 
An inductive method is ... an instrument for the task of constructing a picture of the 
world on the basis of observational data and especially of forming expectations of 
future events as a guidance for practical conduct. X may change this instrument just 
as he changes a saw or an automobile, and for similar reasons ... [A]fter working 
with a particular method for a time, he may not be satisfied and thereby look around 
for another method. ... Here, as anywhere else, life is a process of never ending ad- 
justment; there are no absolutes, neither absolutely certain knowledge about the 
world, nor absolutely perfect methods of working in the world (Camap 1952, 55). 
This remark is characteristic of what Howard Stein has called Carap's dialectical at- 
titude. My suggestion is that we must extend this attitude further. Empirical consid- 
erations guide more than our choice of a single parameter; they infect all of our as- 
sumptions about the significance of the evidence we collect. Our inductive methods 
cannot claim the title of inductive logic because we choose our inductive methods on 
the basis of our understanding of the world which we investigate. 
Notes 
1I would like to thank Erich Reck and Mike Price for comments on earlier drafts 
of this paper, and Howard Stein for discussions on Carnap's views on induction. 
2Camap discusses adequacy conditions in a number of places, e.g., Carnap 1950. 
Kemeny (1963) has provided a succinct list which Carnap endorsed. For a definition 
of c*, see Camap 1945 or the appendix to Carap 1950. Carnap ultimately gave up 
c* (Carnap 1963, 974), but the revised function he proposed suffers from the same 
difficulties that I shall discuss here. 
3ct, which Carnap attributes to Wittgenstein, is defined in Carnap 1952, ?13. 
4These methods correspond to ct and c*, but are defined only for the experiment 
under discussion. They should not be confused with c* and ct which are functions de- 
fined for arbitrary sentences in a first order language. 
5This table is based upon a figure from Camap 1955. 
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6Page references to Carnap 1955 refer to the version reprinted in Brody and 
Grandy 1989. 
7For a discussion of the nature of causal mechanisms and their significance for 
confirmation see Glennan 1992. 
8Specifically, it violates what Carnap calls the axiom of instantial relevance and 
the axiom of convergence (Carnap 1963, 976). These axioms in turn are justified by 
the condition that an inductive method must allow us to learn from experience. 
9In chapter 5 of Glennan 1992, I argue that the background knowledge needed to 
legitimate inference concerns the mechanisms which produce the states of affairs we 
take as evidence. See also Helen Longino's argument for the ineliminability of back- 
ground theory in evidentiary reasoning (Longino 1990, chapter 3). Longino offers ex- 
amples of situations in which differing background assumptions make the same states 
of affairs take on different evidential significance. 
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